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Grahame Johnson, Financial Markets Department
• In this article, the author introduces a historical
database of daily constant-maturity Government of
Canada zero-coupon yield curves. The behaviour and
evolution of these yield curves is examined both over
the full period of 1986 to 2003 and two subperiods,
1986 to 1996, and 1997 to 2003.
• The differences between the actual market prices
of government bonds and the price generated by the
model used to build the yield curves decreased
materially over the term of the database, indicating
more consistent pricing of the individual cash ﬂows
over time.
• The behaviour of government bond yields was
found to be signiﬁcantly different in the second
subperiod. By almost any measure, the government
bond market appears to have become a “safer”
market during this period, exhibiting sharply lower
levels of volatility. While the level of excess returns
earned was slightly lower in the second subperiod,
the volatility of those returns fell much more
sharply, resulting in superior risk-adjusted returns.
• Variations in the yield curve over time could be
almost completely explained by three independent
factors—level, slope, and curvature. The relative
importance of these factors changed signiﬁcantly
between subperiods.
• Contrary to the assumptions implicit in a number of
pricing and risk-management models, none of the
yield-curve measures exhibited daily changes that ﬁt
a normal distribution. For all measures, the
distribution had both a larger number of
observations close to the mean and a larger number
of extreme outliers than would occur under the
assumption of normality.
his article1 introduces a database of historical
Government of Canada zero-coupon yield
curves that has been developed at the Bank
of Canada. Zero-coupon interest rates (or
spot rates) represent the fundamental building blocks
of ﬁxed-income markets. Deﬁned as the interest rate
on a single cash flow maturing at a given time (with
no interest payments prior to maturity), these rates are
usedextensivelytoprice,structure,andhedgeavariety
of ﬁnancial products. For most of these applications, it
is appropriate to use spot interest rates that have been
derived from the interest rates on bank-deposit con-
tracts and the ﬁxed leg of interest rate swap contracts
(referred to as the swap curve). The generation of spot
rates from this yield curve is fairly straightforward, as
each maturity point on the curve has a specific and
unique yield associated with it.2 The resulting spot
rates, however, represent a chartered bank credit, and
as such are not truly free of credit risk. There are a large
number of applications that require a spot rate that is
free of credit risk as an input, making the use of
spot rates derived from the swap yield-to-maturity
curveunsuitable.Fortheseapplications,atermstructure
of zero-coupon interest rates needs to be generated
from an underlying yield curve that is based on
government bonds.
Generating a spot-rate curve from an underlying
government bond yield-to-maturity curve is more
problematic than generating it from the interest rate
swap curve. The Canadian government bond market
contains a large number of issues of varying coupon
rates, maturities, and yields. Only a small proportion
1.  This article is a summary of Bolder, Johnson, and Metzler (2004), which
provides a much more technical discussion of the results.
2. For a detailed description of the construction of swap yield curves see Ron
(2000)
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of these issues are actively traded in the secondary
market, and it has not been unusual for cash ﬂows
that fall on the same date to have different yields.3 As
a result, there is no single government bond yield
for a specific date. This necessitates the use of
numerical curve-ﬁtting techniques. Essentially, these
techniques use mathematical models to estimate a
yield curve that minimizes the difference between the
bond prices predicted by the model and those
observed in the market. The speciﬁc estimation algo-
rithm used to generate the historical government
zero-coupon curves used in this article is based on the
Merrill Lynch exponential spline model introduced in
Li et al. (2001). In this model, a numerical curve-ﬁtting
technique is used to estimate a discount-function
curve.Thediscount-functioncurve isthenusedtoprice
all of the government bonds in the sample, and the
final curve is the one that generates the smallest dif-
ferences between the model prices and the observed
market prices. The final step is to transform the discount-
function curve into a zero-coupon yield curve. The
parameters of the curve are re-estimated each business
day. Full details can be found in Bolder and Gusba
(2002) and Bolder, Johnson, and Metzler (2004).
Thiscurve-ﬁttingalgorithmwasused
to build a database of historical
constant-maturity zero-coupon yield
curves.
This curve-fitting algorithm was used to build a
database of historical constant-maturity zero-coupon
yield curves using daily closing prices for Govern-
ment of Canada bonds over the period January 1986
to May 2003. While historical term-structure data-
bases (such as McCulloch and Kwon)4 exist for the
U.S. Treasury market, to the best of our knowledge,
this represents the ﬁrst such database for Canadian
zero-coupon rates in the public domain. The database
3.  Cash ﬂows often have different yields, depending on whether they repre-
sent an interest payment (the coupon) or the principal repayment (the residual).
4.  The database on term structures for U.S. Treasury bonds is available on
J.J. McCulloch’s website at <http://www.econ.ohio-state.edu/jhm/
jhm.html>.
will be updated on a regular basis and is available to
the public on the Bank of Canada website.
The purpose of this article is both to highlight the
availability of these data and to perform some initial
statistical analysis, examining the behaviour and
evolution of the spot rates over the full period and
two distinct subperiods. The article will specifically
address the following areas:
• the evolution of the levels of key interest
rates and yield-curve measures over the
sample
• the daily changes in these key interest rates
and yield-curve measures
• the identiﬁcation of a relatively small
number of factors that drove the evolution
of the yield curve, and
• the total returns that would have been real-
ized by holding bonds of different maturi-
ties for a given holding period.
The Sample Period
The full data sample used for the analysis in this article
covers the period between January 1986 and May 2003,
and comprises over 4,300 daily yield curves. Both
the Canadian economy and the Canadian ﬁxed-
income markets underwent significant changes over
the period covered by the database, however; and
the full sample of over seventeen years can be thought
of as being composed of at least two distinct subperi-
ods. The ﬁrst subperiod, covering the time from Jan-
uary 1986 to December 1996, can be characterized as
follows:
• relatively high and volatile inﬂation, partic-
ularly for the ﬁrst half of the subperiod;
longer-term inﬂation expectations were
also high and volatile, adjusting to the
reductioninmeasuredinflationwithonlyalag
• large government borrowing requirements
• a fragmented bond market, characterized
by a large number of relatively small and
illiquid issues, and
• restrictions on the stripping and reconsti-
tuting of individual cash ﬂows from the
underlying bonds.
The second subperiod, from January 1997 to the end
of May 2003, had very different conditions. Specifically:19 BANK OF CANADA REVIEW • WINTER 2004–2005
• Inﬂation and inﬂation expectations were
low and stable.
• Beginning in 1996, the Government of Canada
began to run a sequence of budgetary sur-
pluses, sharply reducing net government
borrowing requirements.
• Numerous steps were taken by the Depart-
ment of Finance and the Bank of Canada to
help make the government bond market
more efﬁcient. These included the introduc-
tion of an official benchmark-bond program
with explicit issuance targets and regular
issuance patterns, regular and formal con-
sultations with market participants to dis-
cuss potential changes to the debt program,
and the implementation of a bond buyback
program.
• The Canadian Depository for Securities
(CDS) implemented several initiatives that
helped to increase the efﬁciency of the bond
market. In 1993, reconstituted, packaged,
and generic CUSIPS5 were introduced for
book-entry strip bonds. This enabled indi-
vidual coupon payments with the same
maturity date to be fully fungible, allowing
for increased arbitrage between rich and
cheap bond issues. In 1999, any cash ﬂow of
similar type6 that shared a maturity date
became fully fungible, and in 2001 it
became possible to reconstitute a bond
beyond its original issue size. These devel-
opments ensured that cash ﬂows having
the same issuer and maturity were valued
identically, regardless of the underlying
issue from which they originated.
• Computerized trading strategies and quan-
titative valuation approaches gained
increased popularity in ﬁnancial markets.
Hedge funds, many of which specialize in
ﬁxed-income relative-value arbitrage, also
became much more signiﬁcant factors in
the ﬁxed-income market.
5. CUSIP stands for Committee on Uniform Securities Identiﬁcation Proce-
dures. The CUSIP reference is a combination of nine characters, both letters
and numbers, that represent a unique identiﬁer for a given security. The ﬁrst
six characters identify the issuer, the next two identify the type of security,
and the ﬁnal digit is a check.
6.  Fungible cash ﬂows have to be either interest payments or principal pay-
ments. Interest and principal payments are not yet fungible with each other.
This article will effectively account for two different
regime shifts. The first is a fiscal and macroeconomic
shift, highlighted by the achievement of low infla-
tion and a balanced fiscal position. The second is a
shift in the operation of the actual fixed-income
markets themselves, including changes in the issu-
ance pattern, changes made by CDS, and the growing
importance of quantitative trading strategies. No spe-
ciﬁc date marks a perfect break between these two
regime shifts. The selection of January 1997 as the
date for the break between the two regimes is some-
what arbitrary, and all of the changes highlighted above
actually took place either before or after that date. The
main point, however, is that the period between the
late 1980s and the early 1990s had very different char-
acteristics from the late 1990s and early 2000s, and by
the beginning of 1997, most of those changes were evi-
dent.
This article will effectively account
for two different regime shifts.
The Yield-Curve Model
The database of historical yield curves was built
using a mathematical curve-ﬁtting model that ﬁnds a
specific zero-coupon yield curve on a given day that
minimizes the difference between bond prices predicted
by the model and those actually observed in the market.
An examination of the size of the pricing errors gen-
erated by these “best-fit” curves offers some insight
into how consistent the pricing of government bonds
was at a given time. If the full universe of govern-
ment securities were priced on a consistent basis, with
cash flows of a similar term to maturity trading at
similar yields (regardless of which specific bond
issue those cash ﬂows were associated with), then the
model should produce a very accurate fit, with little
pricing error. If, on the other hand, individual bond
issues exhibited idiosyncratic pricing, with cash ﬂows
of similar maturities trading at signiﬁcantly different
yields, then the pricing errors produced by the model
should be relatively large. Furthermore, given the
evolution of market conditions outlined in the pre-
vious section, it would be reasonable to expect a
reduction in the pricing error over time, since a20 BANK OF CANADA REVIEW • WINTER 2004–2005
number of changes were introduced to make the
government bond market more efﬁcient.
Chart 1 shows the evolution of the goodness-of-ﬁt of
the model.7 The root mean-square error for each year
is shown, along with a time trend.
Individual cash ﬂows of similar
maturity are now valued in a more
consistent fashion.
The goodness-of-ﬁt of the model has clearly increased
substantially over time. The average error over the
ﬁrst subperiod was 11.1 basis points, while it fell to 5.2
basis points for the second subperiod. Bond yields for
the full universe of Government of Canada securities
are now far more consistent with the prices predicted
by a theoretical yield curve. This indicates that individ-
ual cash ﬂows of similar maturity are now valued in a
more consistent fashion, regardless of the specific
bond from which the cash flow originated, or whether
the cash flow represents an interest payment or a
return of principal. While it is difficult to assign causal-
7.  The graph plots the average daily root mean-square error for each year
covered by the sample. The root mean-square error is equal to the square root
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ity, changes of this nature are consistent with both the
initiatives undertaken by the CDS to make similar cash
ﬂows fully interchangeable and the increasing preva-
lence of quantitative valuation methods and compu-
terized trading strategies in ﬁxed-income markets.
General Attributes of the Yield
Curves
A ﬁrst step in the analysis of the evolution of the yield
curve is to examine what the “average” yield curve
looked like, both over the full time period covered by
the data set, and over each of the two subperiods.
Charts 2 and 3 depict these yield curves (surrounded
by confidence bands of plus and minus onestandard
deviation).
As Chart 2 shows, the average spot-yield curve over
the entire period was upward sloping, with a 3-month
interest rate of approximately 6.5 per cent and a 10-year
interest rate of approximately 7.5 per cent. The varia-
tion around these averages, however, was extremely
large. The one standard-deviation confidence band
covers a range for the 3-month yield of approximately
3.5 per cent to 9.5 per cent, while for the 10-year rate,
the band is between 5.5 per cent and 9.5 per cent.
Chart 3, which shows the average yield curves for the
two subperiods, gives some indication of the magnitude
of the changes in the shape, slope, and level of the
yield curve over the two samples.
Chart 2
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As Chart 3 shows, the two yield curves are significantly
different. The pre-1997 yield curve is upward sloping,
with an average 3-month rate of approximately
8 per cent and an average 10-year rate of about
9 per cent. The dispersion of yields over the period is
very high, with the standard-deviation confidence
band ranging from 5.5 per cent to 10.5 per cent for
the 3-month rate and from 7.5 per cent to 10 per cent
for the 10-year rate.
While the general shape of the post-1996 yield curve is
similar to that of the curve from the ﬁrst subperiod
(both are upward sloping), there are two obvious dif-
ferences. First, the general level of yields in the sec-
ond subperiod was materially lower. So much
lower, in fact, that the upper conﬁdence band of the
later subperiod is well below the lower conﬁdence
band of the ﬁrst. Second, it appears that the dispersion
of yields around the average curve is much narrower in
the second subperiod.
While the average yield curves shown above graphically
depict the differences in the term structure between
the two periods, statistical tests were also conducted
onanumberofrepresentativeyield-curvemeasuresto
quantify the observed differences between subperiods.
The specific measures examined were the 3-month
yield, the 10-year yield, the slope of the yield curve,
and the degree of curvature of the yield curve. The
slope measure was deﬁned as the difference between
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was deﬁned as the difference between the 6-year yield
and the average of the 2-year and 10-year yields. The
statistical tests conﬁrmed what is shown in Charts 2
and 3. The level of yields, both 3-month and 10-year,
were not only signiﬁcantly lower in the post-1996
period, but they were also much less variable. The
slope of the yield curve was found to be materially
steeper in the second period, while the degree of cur-
vature showed relatively little change. The full details
are presented in Table 1.
Daily Yield Changes and
Distributions
The previous section examined the appearance of
average yield curves over the period, presenting
some detail about the average values and variances of
the levels for four different yield-curve measures. Of
potentially more interest than the levels of these meas-
ures, however, is the behaviour of the daily changes in
these levels, since it is these changes in yield that
drive the short-term risk and return behaviour for
government bonds. Almost all derivative-pricing
algorithms, portfolio-management tools, and risk-
measurement models make some assumptions about
the distribution of returns over a given time horizon,
the most common being that returns are normally dis-
tributed. Since, for a zero-coupon bond, short-term
returns are almost entirely driven by yield changes, it
follows that an assumption that returns are normally
distributed is equivalent to assuming that, over short
time horizons, yield changes also have a normal dis-
tribution. If this is, in fact, not the case, then any
model that makes the assumption of normality
3-month
yield 6.46 1.78 13.57 7.94 2.76 13.57 4.01 1.78 5.76
(2.9) (2.8) (1.1)
10-year
yield 7.62 4.53 11.32 8.84 6.21 11.32 5.61 4.53 7.03
(1.8) (1.1) (0.5)
Slope 1.16 -3.21 4.08 0.90 -3.21 3.93 1.60 -35.37 407.47
(1.7) (1.8) (1.2)




Yield- Full sample 1986–96 1997–2003
curve
measure Meanb Min. Max. Meanb Min. Max. Meanb Min. Max.
a. All values are expressed as percentages.
b. Standard deviations of the measures appear in brackets below the means.22 BANK OF CANADA REVIEW • WINTER 2004–2005
could be producing results that provide inaccurate
prices or risk measures.
Table 2 presents the statistical details of the daily
changes. Two key observations can be made from
Table 2. Specifically:
• While the mean change for all measures
was very close to zero, the uncertainty sur-
rounding the changes for all measures was
very large. As was evident in Table 1 (sum-
mary table of yield levels), however, this
variance was signiﬁcantly lower in the
post-1996 period.
• All of the yield-curve measures had some
extreme outliers, with every measure hav-
ing several observations that were up to 12
to 13 standard deviations away from the
mean. While the absolute magnitude of the
outliers was much smaller in the second
subsample, their distance from the mean as
measured by standard deviations was very
similar.
It is this presence of extreme outliers that suggests that
the distribution of daily yield changes may not be
normal. These extreme outliers were not one-time
occurrences, but happened with some degree of reg-
ularity. Over the full sample period, each of the vari-
ous measures saw between 30 and 50 observations fall
outside of four standard deviations from the mean.
Observations as extreme as those highlighted in Table
2 are practically statistical impossibilities under the
normal distribution.8
8.  For example, an observation that is 12 standard deviations from the mean
would only be expected to happen once every 1020 years under the normal
distribution.
3-month
yield -0.15 -120.6 188.3 -0.25 -120.7 188.3 0.03 -51.5 70.8
(14.5) (17.3) (7.9)
10-year
yield -0.12 -92.1 62.1 -0.11 -92.1 62.1 -0.13 -22.4 23.5
(7.3) (8.3) (5.2)
Slope 0.03 -176.3 93.1 0.14 -176.3 93.1 -0.16 -76.8 53.4
(15.0) (17.7) (8.9)
Curvature 0.00 -50.8 66.7 0.01 -50.8 66.7 -0.01 -33.3 32.7
(4.8) (5.8) (2.4)
Table 2
Summary Yield-Curve Measures: Daily Changesa
Yield- Full sample 1986–96 1997–2003
curve
measure Meanb Min. Max. Meanb Min. Max. Meanb Min. Max.
a. All values are in basis points (one-hundredth of a per cent).
b. Standard deviations for the measures appear in brackets below the means.
Chart 4 takes this analysis a step further, plotting the
distribution graphs of the daily yield changes for each
yield-curve measure compared with a theoretical nor-
mal distribution. This provides further evidence that
the daily yield changes do not appear to be normally
distributed.
For simplicity of presentation, the various yield-curve
measures are not broken up into subperiods, and only
the distributions for the full samples are plotted. The
characteristics of the distributions in the subperiods are
consistent, however, with the distribution of the period
as a whole, with no material change between the ﬁrst
andsecondtimeperiods.AsChart4shows,notonlydo
the distributions contain some extreme outliers, they
also have far more observations close to the mean than
would be expected under the normal distribution.
These two characteristics (the presence of a relatively
large number of extreme outliers and observations
that are heavily centred around the mean) represent
clear evidence of non-normality, and formal statistical
tests ﬁrmly reject the hypothesis that the distributions
are normal.9
These two characteristics (the
presence of a relatively large number
of extreme outliers and observations
that are heavily centred around the
mean) represent clear evidence of
non-normality.
The historical shapes of these distributions have some
interesting repercussions for pricing algorithms, port-
folio-managementmodels,andriskmeasuresthatrely
on the underlying assumption of normally distributed
yield changes. These models would have systematically
underpredicted the probability of a very small change
in yields (or overstated the risk), while at the same
time they would also have underpredicted the proba-
bility of a very large change in yields (or understated
the risk). Options markets do, however, appear to
compensate for at least part of this pattern by pricing
optionswithvariousstrikepricesusingdifferentimplied
volatility levels. Options with strike prices that are
further away from the current price trade with a higher
9.  Jarque-Bera probabilities for all distributions are 0.0000.23 BANK OF CANADA REVIEW • WINTER 2004–2005
implied volatility than do options with strike prices
very close to the current price. This, in effect, compen-
sates for the fact that the deep out-of-the-money options
are more likely to be exercised than the standard nor-
mal-distribution assumptions of some option-pricing
models would indicate. Nonetheless, it remains an
interesting question as to whether specific trading
strategies that were structured to beneﬁt from the ten-
dency of yields to move either very little or very much
(relative to a normal distribution) would have been
abnormally proﬁtable.10
Principal-Component Analysis
Principal-component analysis attempts to describe the
behaviour of a range of correlated random variables
(in this case, the various spot yields for different
times to maturity) in terms of a small number of
10.  An example of such a strategy would have been to maintain a short posi-
tion in bond options with strike prices close to the current market price, while
holding an offsetting long position in deep out-of-the-money options.
uncorrelatedprincipalcomponents.Thistypeofanalysis
makes it possible to identify a relatively small
number of factors that have affected the behaviour
of the entire zero-coupon curve over the period exam-
ined. While there are many practical applications for
this analysis, the ability to construct more complete
hedges for a bond portfolio is likely one of the most
important. Once a small number of key factors that
explain almost all of the risk faced by a given bond
portfolio are determined, it is possible to create a rep-
licating portfolio that immunizes the original against
any shocks driven by those key factors. For anything
other than a very simple bond portfolio, this would
provide superior protection compared with more
naive immunization approaches, such as simple dura-
tion matching.
This approach was first applied to bond yields by
Litterman and Scheinkman (1991), who found three
common factors that influenced the returns on all
treasury bonds over the period they examined,
explaining, on average, 98.4 per cent of the variance
10-year yields, ﬁrst differences
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in yields. The ﬁrst factor, which they called level, rep-
resented an approximately parallel shift higher or
lower in the yield curve. A shock to this factor raised or
lowered all yields by roughly the same amount.
Level was by far the most important factor, account-
ing for 89.5 per cent of the total explained variance.
The second factor was called steepness, since a positive
shock to this factor lowered short-term spot rates,
while raising longer-term rates. This factor was
found to account for 8.5 per cent of total explained
variance. A positive shock to the third factor, which
they called curvature, lowered both short- and long-
term yields, while raising mid-term yields. This had
the effect of increasing the degree of curvature in
the term structure. The curvature factor accounted for
2.0 per cent of the explained variance. This model has
been applied to other interest rate markets with simi-
lar results,11 and it has become standard practice in
ﬁnance to refer to shifts in yield curves as being driven
by three underlying factors: level, slope, and curvature.
Table 3 shows the results of a principal-component
analysis of the Canadian zero-coupon curves, both
over the full period and for each of the two subperiods.
Similar to the results of Litterman and Scheinkman,
the ﬁrst three factors were found to explain essentially
all of the variation in the spot rates over the period.
The ﬁrst factor, level, was by far the most important.
The proportion of total variance explained by this fac-
tor fell fairly sharply, however, in the second subpe-
riod. The second most important factor, slope, saw a
corresponding increase in the proportion of total vari-
ance it explained, having over three times as much
explanatory power in the second subperiod as it did
in the first. This shift suggests an important change
in the dynamics of the yield curve over the full sam-
ple. A change in the absolute level of interest rates
11.  For example, Buhler and Zimmermann (1996) ﬁnd similar results for the
Swiss and German markets, while Knez, Litterman, and Scheinkman (1994)
proposed a three- and four-factor model to explain U.S. money market
returns.
1986–96 89.8 8.4 1.3 99.6
1997–2003 72.6 25.8 1.4 99.7
Full sample 83.1 15.2 1.4 99.6
Table 3
Percentage Variation Explained
Period Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 Total
Level Slope Curvature
became a signiﬁcantly less important risk factor in the
second subperiod than in the first, while changes in the
slopeofthecurvebecamesignificantlymoreimportant.
While outright changes in the level of yields still con-
stituted the dominant risk factor, the risk associated
with changes in the slope of the curve tripled in the
second subperiod. Finally, the curvature factor
explained a relatively small, but constant, degree of
variation in both subperiods.
The ﬁrst three factors were found to
explain essentially all of the variation
in the spot rates over the period.
Chart 5, which shows the impact of a shock to one of
the factors on a sample yield curve, helps to explain
the interpretation of the various factors and demon-
strates why they were named level, slope, and curvature.
Allthreefactorsbehaveverysimilarlytothosedescribed
in Litterman and Scheinkman. The level factor corre-
sponds to a roughly parallel shift in yields across the
term structure; a positive shock to the slope factor
lowers short-term rates, while increasing longer-
term rates; while a positive shock to the curvature
factor lowers very short- and long-term rates but
increases mid-term yields.
Traditional interest rate risk management emphasizes
duration matching, immunizing a portfolio against
parallel shifts in yields. This type of hedging strategy
effectively only immunizes the portfolio against shifts
in the ﬁrst factor (level). While this clearly represents
the largest source of variation in yields, it ignores a
substantial amount of risk (only about 73 per cent of
thetotalvariationinyieldswouldhavebeenimmunized
against in the second subperiod). A more complete
hedging strategy would be to calculate the sensitivity
of a bond portfolio to all three factors. Once these
sensitivities are known, it is possible to construct a
hedging portfolio that offsets the exposure to these
factors. Properly constructed, a hedging strategy
based on all three factors would protect against over
99 per cent of the variability in the term structure.
This type of hedging strategy has been the subject of
a relatively large amount of research, and additional
information can be found in Barber and Copper25 BANK OF CANADA REVIEW • WINTER 2004–2005
(1996), Golub and Tilman (1997), and Lardic, Priaulet,
and Priaulet (2003).
Holding-Period Returns
The expectations hypothesis on the term structure of
interest rates maintains that longer-term interest rates
are simply the average of expected future short-term
rates plus a risk premium. If the value of this risk pre-
mium is set to zero, it follows that the expected returns
on zero-coupon bonds of all maturities will be equal
over a given time horizon (e.g., purchasing a 10-year
bond and selling it within one year provides the
same expected return as holding a 1-year bond to
maturity).12 If the term premium is positive, longer-
term bonds will have a higher expected return over a
given horizon than shorter-term bonds. This extra
expected return represents compensation for the addi-
tional risk associated with the longer-term bonds,
since its actual realized return is uncertain.
The historical yield-curve series can be used to exam-
ine a number of questions related to this hypothesis.13
First, the data series was evaluated to see if bonds of
different maturities provided equivalent returns, on
average, for a given holding period over the sample,
or if certain maturity assets earned some measure of
excess returns. Second, were the returns earned from
holding longer-term instruments riskier (or more vari-
able) than they were for shorter-term bonds? Third,
if the risk level did vary across maturities, did some
maturities consistently produce better risk-adjusted
returns than others? Finally, results were compared
across the subperiods to see if the risk-return profile
across the yield curve changed.
Holding-period returns (HPRS) are defined as the total
return earned by purchasing an asset at the beginning
of the period, holding it for a given time horizon, and
either redeeming it at maturity for a known amount,
or selling it in the secondary market. HPRs were calcu-
lated using zero-coupon bonds with maturities of one,
two, ﬁve, and 10 years for a holding period of 180
days. The difference between these returns and the risk-
12.  The expected capital gain or loss from selling the longer-term instrument
at the end of the horizon would exactly offset the interest differential between
the two maturities.
13.  Any conclusions would only represent the behaviour of the yield curve
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free return that could have been earned by simply pur-
chasing a 180-day bond and holding it to maturity is
referred to as the excess HPR, and it is this result that is
of most interest. The use of excess HPRs allows for an
adjustment for changes in the level of the reference
risk-free rate over the period. This is an important
point in a sample that saw short-term yields range from
2 per cent to 14 per cent, as an HPR of 10 per cent (for
example) could represent either a good or bad outcome,
depending on the prevailing level of the risk-free rate.
Table 4 shows the summary results for HPRs across
both the full period and the subsamples. Two main
conclusions emerge from the results:
• Excess HPRs get both larger and more vola-
tile as the term to maturity of the underly-
ing bond increases. Longer-term bonds had
higher levels of risk, but also provided
higher levels of return. This observation
holds for both the ﬁrst and second subsam-
ples.
• While excess HPRs appeared to be lower in
the 1997 to 2003 period, the difference was
not statistically signiﬁcant. Volatility of
returns,however,wassigniﬁcantlylowerin
the second subsample, with the standard
deviation of excess returns generally only
half the level it was for the ﬁrst subsample.
It appears, therefore, that longer-maturity bonds carried
a risk premium to compensate for their higher levels
of risk (or variability of return), and that both return
and return variability fell in the second subsample.
This analysis cannot tell, however, whether the incre-
mental returns earned on the longer-dated assets were
1-year 0.61 -3.27 4.05 0.69 -3.27 4.05 0.51 -1.61 2.86
(1.18) (1.40) (0.70)
2-year 1.53 -11.10 12.53 1.69 -11.10 12.53 1.32 -3.57 8.13
(3.57) (4.37) (2.20)
5-year 3.17 -28.24 26.18 3.46 -28.24 26.18 2.79 -11.58 15.86
(8.35) (10.17) (5.35)
10-year 4.89 -49.66 38.18 5.24 -49.66 38.18 4.45 -21.92 31.79
(14.48) (17.48) (9.82)
Table 4
Summary Statistics for 180-Day Excess Holding-
Period Returns
Bond Full sample (%) 1986–96 (%) 1997–2003 (%)
Meana Min. Max. Meana Min. Max. Meana Min. Max.
a. Standard deviations for the measures appear in brackets below the means.
sufﬁcient to compensate for the additional variability
of those returns. For this, it is necessary to examine the
risk-adjusted returns for the various bond maturities.
One of the simplest methods for calculating risk-
adjusted returns for different assets is to construct
a ratio of the excess HPRS to the volatility of those
returns, commonly known as a Sharpe ratio (Sharpe
1966, 1975). These ratios were calculated for both the
full sample period and both subperiods, and the
results appear in Table 5.
Two main characteristics of the Sharpe ratios are
apparent. First, the ratios decrease with the time to
maturity of the bonds for all the sample periods. It
would appear, therefore, that the incremental return
earned by extending maturity did not compensate for
the increase in risk. Second, Sharpe ratios for all maturi-
ties examined were signiﬁcantly higher in the 1997 to
2003 sample, indicating a superior risk-reward trade-
off in the second subperiod.
There is one overriding caveat to any conclusions that
may be drawn from the analysis of excess HPRs, and
that is that they are all based on ex post observations.
The majority of the shocks that took place over the
period resulted in yields falling further than could
have been reasonably expected ex ante (as witnessed
by the signiﬁcantly lower yield levels in the second
subperiod), resulting in large positive returns for
longer-maturity fixed-income assets. As such, the ex post
excess HPRs for the sample period are likely not indic-
ative of what was expected ex ante, nor should they be
seen as indicative of what should be expected in the
future. In general, during periods of regime shifts,
ex post observations are not good measures of what
was (or should be) expected ex ante.
1-year 0.61 1.18 0.52 0.69 1.40 0.49 0.51 0.70 0.73
2-year 1.53 3.57 0.43 1.69 4.37 0.39 1.32 2.20 0.60
5-year 3.17 8.35 0.38 3.46 10.17 0.34 2.79 5.35 0.52
10-year 4.89 14.48 0.34 5.24 17.48 0.30 4.45 9.82 0.45
Table 5
Sharpe Ratios
Bond Full sample 1986–96 1997–2003
Mean Std. Sharpe Mean Std. Sharpe Mean Std. Sharpe
excess dev. ratio excess dev. ratio excess dev. ratio
(%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%)27 BANK OF CANADA REVIEW • WINTER 2004–2005
Conclusions
This article has presented a relatively high-level over-
view of the behaviour of the Government of Canada
zero-coupon yield curve over a period of approximately
17.5 years. The analysis is based on what we believe to
be the first historical constant-maturity Government of
Canada zero-coupon yield-curve series to be publicly
available. Four predominant conclusions can be drawn
from the results presented here.
First, the differential between the actual market prices
of government bonds and the price predicted by the
yield-curve model decreased sharply over the period
covered by the database. This is indicative of less
idiosyncratic, more consistent pricing across different
bond issues—that is, cash flows of similar maturity
arepricedatasimilaryield,regardlessofwhichspecific
bond they originated from.
Second, by almost any measure, the government bond
market became a “safer” place during the latter part of
the sample (1997 to 2003). While it is not possible to
assign direct causality, the numerous changes in the
fiscal and economic environment outlined earlier in
this article coincided with a marked decrease in both
the level and volatility of interest rates. Furthermore,
while the level of excess returns earned for various
bonds was slightly lower in the second subperiod, the
volatility of those returns fell even more, resulting
in superior risk-adjusted returns.
The third conclusion is that, similar to the other major
bond markets, variations in the Government of Canada
yield curve over the sample period could be almost
totally explained by three factors—level, slope, and
curvature. While the total proportion of variance
explained remained very stable over the entire period
(ranging from 99.0 per cent to 99.9 per cent), the
breakdown of the three factors varied considerably.
Finally, none of the yield-curve measures examined
had daily changes that fit a normal distribution. All
of the distributions were characterized by both a much
larger number of observations clustered around the
mean and a much larger number of extreme outliers
than would be expected under an assumption of
normality. The behaviour of the yield curve over the
period in question could be characterized as general
stability punctuated by periods of extreme moves.
This has implications for the large number of portfolio-
management, risk-measurement, and derivative-
pricing models that rely on an underlying assump-
tion of normality in bond returns. That assumption
has clearly not held up over time.
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